I. INTRODUCTION
Amid the enumerated powers delegated to Congress in the Constitution is the power to "regulate commerce . ..among the several states."' For over fifty years after President Franklin Roosevelt embarked on his New Deal with America, the Commerce Clause was interpreted by the Supreme Court to practically grant plenary power to Congress to pass regulation. 2 During that time, the Court found no federal regulation unconstitutional on grounds that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority. 3 This helps explain the shockwave that swept through both the legal profession and academy when in 1995, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez found the Gun Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) of 1990, which criminalized possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school zone, to be an unconstitutional exercise of that authority. 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court's majority, outlined three categories of regulation to operate as a limiting principle on the scope of Commerce Clause authority: the law must regulate a channel of interstate commerce, the law must regulate an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the regulated purely intrastate activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 5 Being neither a channel of interstate commerce, such as a road or a river, nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as a truck or a boat, the GFSZA had to substantially affect interstate commerce to be constitutional. 6 The Court summarily stated that the Act "ha [d] nothing to do with 'commerce,"' thereby placing a limit on Congress in making law under the Commerce Clause. 7 Questions arose as to whether the Court had imposed new, permanent limitations on Congressional power or whether Lopez was a mere aberration, nothing more than a flexing of Supreme Court muscle to strike down a law with no connection to commercial activity whatsoever.' Those questions were answered in 2000 when the Court again found a law unconstitutional on the same grounds. 9 In United States v. Morrison, the Court reviewed whether the private right of action for victims of violent crimes, created within the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), provided little guidance to the lower courts for finding the boundary between economic criminal conduct and noneconomic criminal conduct. As such, circuit splits have arisen in a menagerie of criminal law suits addressing constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. For instance, the Fifth Circuit held that a law criminalizing possession of child pornography made with material traveling through interstate commerce is constitutional. 25 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found the same law unconstitutional when applied to the owner of a photograph in which both herself and her ten-year-old daughter were depicted exposing themselves explicitly. 6 This paper's purpose is to impersonate a Machiavellian scribe, whispering in the collective ear of the circuit court judges confronting Commerce Clause challenges. The debate over the original intent of "commerce" is set aside, with focus being diverted to the operation of the Economic Activity Test, coupled with the Attenuation Factor. 7 In the interests of uniformity among the lower courts, consistency with Lopez and Morrison, and a structured and principled rule of law, this paper proposes the following limiting interpretation of the two Morrison factors. First, a law that directly affects some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. 28 Second, a law that has the purpose of regulating some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. 29 In determining whether a law has the purpose of regulating valuable transactions, courts should review whether a jurisdictional element is Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 369, 369-70 (noting some commentators have called Lopez nothing more than "symbolic"). 25 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2003) ; Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 226 (addressing whether an owner of photographs and films made for personal use depicting teenage girls engaging in sexually explicit activity was criminally liable). 26 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115. 27 See id. at 1119 (beginning with a review of "whether simple intrastate possession of child pornography, without more, is a commercial or economic activity," and with a review of "whether the connection between such possession and interstate commerce is attenuated" both because "they are related and require a similar analytic approach, [and] because they are the most important ones") (emphasis added); see, e.g., sources cited supra note 16. 28 This category is derived from Morrison's Economic Activity Test. 29 This category is derived from Morrison's Attenuation Factor, which imposes a limit on the Economic Activity Test. This paper interprets the Attenuation Factor to mean that a law with only indirect effects on valuable transactions must have the purpose of directly affecting valuable transactions. All laws that merely indirectly affect valuable transactions and are shown not to have the purpose of regulating valuable transactions are unconstitutional. See infra Section IlI.A. employed as well as the intent of the legislature in passing the law. 30 A law that satisfies either the direct effect or the purpose category substantially effects interstate commerce, satisfies Lopez and Morrison, and is resultantly constitutional.
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody
Section II of this paper briefly surveys the history of the definition of commerce and shows how its ever-changing definition has been central to the variation in breadth of the enumerated power. Additionally, the inconsistencies among the circuit courts in application of Morrison's Economic Activity Test are explained in this section. In Section III, the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this paper is itself tested. First, the structure of the analysis is explained, and justifications for a limited interpretation of Lopez and Morrison are presented. This paper's test is also applied to past Supreme Court precedent as a means of validation in this Section. Although much of the Lopez and Morrison Commerce Clause analysis is flexible and interpretable, the Supreme Court was adamant that neither case overturned past Commerce Clause precedent. Per this stance, any Commerce Clause interpretation that produces results in conflict with past precedent does not comport with either Lopez or Morrison. Whether these two cases were correctly decided or not, the overarching goal of the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here is to conform the lower courts to Morrison, not to conform Morrison to an Originalist's, Textualist's, or Pragmatist's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
This interpretation is no more relevant than a Commerce Clause cocktail party anecdote if unable to derive the results previously reached by the Court. Finally, Section IV is devoted to applying this newly minted limited Economic Activity interpretation to the quagmire of lower court criminal law decisions that motivated this paper. This section explains how adoption of the proposed interpretation creates a uniform standard and alleviates the current inconsistencies among the lower courts. The battleground for the New Federalism has formed in the realm of criminal law, which typically has little to do with economic activity. 3 A clear approach to adjudicating Commerce Clause attacks is needed if the Court's New Federalism is to survive in the lower courts. 30 The existence of a jurisdictional element, such as the phrase "traveled through interstate commerce," is the second factor employed in 
II. A SURVEY OF THE INCONSISTENT MEANING OF COMMERCE AND SOME RECENT EFFECTS OF THAT INCONSISTENCY
The breadth of the power to regulate commerce among the several states has wildly fluctuated throughout the nation's history. Until the late nineteenth century, however, the Court barely addressed the scope of the power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. The general law was that regulation of commerce included the regulation of people in the process of, and activities associated with, conducting transactions of commodities. 2 With respect to criminal regulation, the Commerce Clause extended to acts interfering with, obstructing, or preventing the exercise of power to regulate commerce and navigation among the several states. 33 The 32 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). New York passed and amended an act that granted R. R. Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive license to operate steam boats in New York waterways. This monopoly was to run for thirty years, beginning in 1808. Id. at 6-7. Aaron Ogden acquired title to this exclusive license from Livingston and Fulton and operated a ferry service between New Jersey and New York. Id. at 7. In 1818, Ogden filed an injunction against Thomas Gibbons, who had begun to operate a competing ferry service without license in violation of Ogden's exclusive right. Id. at 1, 6-8. Gibbons argued that "the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed" under a federal act "for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels ... in the coasting trade . . . property; whether the act be done on shore, or in any of the enumerated places below high water mark. In our opinion, the latter is the true interpretation of this clause of the section."). In Champion v. Ames, the Court held constitutional the criminalization of the sale of lottery tickets using interstate channels on the ground that articles of traffic, such as lottery tickets, are articles of commerce. 188 U.S. 321 (1903 power decreased just prior to the turn of the century with the passing of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. 34 The Court began distinguishing between activities involving mining, manufacturing, or agriculture and those involving commerce, extending Congressional lawmaking authority to the latter but not the former. 35 During this time, the Court also experimented with drawing Commerce Clause distinctions between those regulations having direct effects on commerce and those having indirect effects.
I..."
3 6 In 1937, after a period during which the Court rejected a series of New Deal regulations designed to stimulate the economy out of the Depression, the Court abandoned these formal tests, 37 replacing them with a deferential approach to Commerce Clause challenges that effectively granted Congress plenary regulatory authority. 38 49 Thus, a limiting principle could be applied to the third category of Commerce Clause power:
Congress may regulate economic activity that has a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 50 Finding no regulation of any economic activity within the text of the GFSZA, and rebuffing the government's argument that the effects of guns near school zones are sufficiently related to general economic harm to society, the Court rejected the GFSZA as unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds." In concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor looked to federalism principles for support. Rather than apply the formula created by the majority opinion, the two Justices advocated an inquiry into whether the activity at issue was traditionally regulated by the States. 53 Five years later, again in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court in Morrison 4 further defined the boundary of the Commerce Clause. In that case, a female student accused two football players at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute of rape. 5 The female student filed a complaint under the Violence Against Women's Act (VAWA), which created a private right of action for female victims of violence against their assailants. 5 6 The Court began by categorizing the VAWA under the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez, 7 assigning four factors for review: (1) whether the regulation involves "economic activity," (2) 48 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. whether a jurisdictional element limits the regulation's application, (3) whether existing legislative intent is rational, and (4) whether the regulation has more than an attenuated effect on interstate commerce.
58
Notwithstanding voluminous evidence presented by Congress that violence against women creates a significant pecuniary cost for society, the Court held that the VAWA involved no economic activity and was consequently unconstitutional.9
In both cases, the Court emphasized that this seemingly new limitation on Commerce Clause power was not tantamount to a blanket reversal of the past fifty years' jurisprudence. 60 Instead, the Court imposed a limiting principle on the meaning of commerce, one that had arguably been implied throughout Commerce Clause history. Legislation regulating economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce will be sustained as constitutional. 61 Furthermore, deference to Congressional findings regarding the effects on commerce of noneconomic activity is alone insufficient to show economic activity. 62 All regulations that directly affect economic activities and even some regulations of noneconomic activities are constitutional. 6 3 58 Id. at 609-13 (summarizing the framework initially reviewed in Lopez). Implicitly, this conveyed a message to Congress that the bounds of its Commerce Clause authority are so broad that only regulation of activity so unconnected to commerce as to never be deemed commercial is unconstitutional. 66 But lower courts are now trying to mold the contours of the "economic criminal conduct. 67 The courts have resultantly conflicted regarding whether various federal laws are constitutional, particularly child pornography laws, abortion clinic protections, and machinegun possession laws, all discussed below.
The Child Pornography Backdrop Through the Kallestad and McCoy Courts
Child pornography laws have been included in chapters of the U.S. Code designed to protect children from abuse. 68 Charles Kallestad was discovered possessing a substantial quantity of nude photographs and movies of women, some of whom appeared to be minors.
72
He met many of these girls after advertising in the local newspaper for "slender female nude models," and had stated in several of these advertisements that age was irrelevant. 7 3 Of those who responded, some were as young as sixteen or seventeen, a fact about which Kallestad was aware.
74
Kallestad was convicted on six counts of violating § 2252(a)(4)(B). 7 5
The Fifth Circuit systematically reviewed the four-part test created in Morrison, after summarily determining that § 2252(a)(4)(B) could only be upheld under the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez.
76
The court distinguished § 2252(a)(4)(B) from the GFSZA to interpret the law as a regulation of an economic activity. 77 Recognizing that mere possession of this pornographic material is inherently different than the trade of the same material, the court analogized homemade child pornography to Although displaying concern regarding encroachment upon state police power, Congress was "convinced that the use of children in the production of pornographic material is a matter that cannot be adequately controlled by state and local authorities" alone. Id. at 10. Among the most startling evidence of this problem's magnitude was the research of Robin Lloyd, who had discovered over 260 unique periodicals depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 5. 70 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (pertaining to "[c]ertain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors").
"t 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000). Subsection (B) states that anyone who "knowingly possesses I or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction ... transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials . . . [so] transported . . . shall be punished . . ." if "such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
72 Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 226. 77 Id. at 228 (distinguishing § 2252(a)(4)(B) from the GFSZA).
Filburn's home-grown wheat at issue in Wickard v. Filburn. 78 The court held that production of a good for which a liquid market exists, such as the wheat and child pornography markets, is economic and commercial in character in the aggregate, even when particular quantities are produced for personal consumption. 79 As a result, the Fifth Circuit found § 2252(a)(4)(B) constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 0 Three years later in United States v. McCoy, 8 " the Ninth Circuit reviewed § 2252(a)(4)(B). Jonathan and Rhonda McCoy, parents of a tenyear-old girl and twenty-month-old son, were at home with their children preparing for Easter. 82 Rhonda, who was disposed to heavy alcohol use, was photographed next to her daughter while both were exposing their genitals. 83 The film developer discovered the photograph. 8 4 Jonathan was acquitted of all charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b), a statute that prohibits the manufacture by a parent of child pornography with materials that were transported through interstate commerce. Rhonda, however, was charged with possession of the photograph per § 2252(a)(4)(B)." 5 The court systematically reviewed the four elements defined in Morrison and concluded that the law was unconstitutionally applied to McCoy. 86 Id. at 1119-33. Suppose that a person is charged with violating a federal criminal statute. Among his strategic alternatives to avoid conviction is to assert an affirmative defense that the law is inapplicable, despite admission that his actions would make him liable under the law. If reviewed on constitutional grounds, this inapplicability can be asserted in one of two ways. The law may be an impermissible application of the lawmaker's authority to pass law, or the law may be permissible but does not constitutionally apply to the circumstances in the particular suit. The former is dubbed a "facial challenge" and the latter an "as- provides reproductive health services. 9 In 1994, Frank Bird, a known radical pro-life activist, threw a bottle at the windshield of a car driven by an abortion provider driving into the parking lot of the America's Women Clinic in Houston. 93 Bird was arrested, charged with, and convicted of violating § 248(a).
94
He raised a defense that the FACE Act was an unconstitutional use of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 95 (finding no broader economic regulation using the FACE, "no rational basis for finding that a substantial relationship exists between the regulated activity and commerce," and "no intrastate commercial activity generated by the anti-abortion activities that arguably generates funds for other criminal activity that is interstate in nature").
1o6 Aside from the jurisprudential chaos currently existing, the effects of Bird H have also been political. Attorney General John Ashcroft has announced intentions to appeal the Southern District's decision, threatening to alienate social conservatives from whom both U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) was a regulation of economic activity,°7 an analysis explicitly rejected in Morrison.1 08 The McCoy Court found no economic activity in the defendant's possession of homemade child pornography, since McCoy's picture did not affect demand in the child pornography market.' 0 9 The Fifth Circuit in Bird I decided that the FACE Act is a "legitimate regulation of intrastate activity having a substantial affect on interstate commerce" based entirely upon Congressional findings." 0 Yet the Bird II Court, rejecting the sufficiency of Congressional findings, stated that the FACE Act was not a regulation of economic activity."' Two causes for the circuit splits are evident. First, both the Lopez and Morrison majority opinions reflect the Chief Justice's terse writing style, which had the effect here of creating enormous room for interpretive variance. Lopez and Morrison may be read, for instance, to only apply to laws so ridiculously unrelated to commerce that the Court cannot remain mute. Even more broadly interpreted, the Court's reliance on case-by-case adjudication may reflect a wish to limit the cases to their facts. Most likely, however, the Chief Justice wrote the opinions with so much interpretive room in order to retain his majority."2 The Kallestad, McCoy, Bird I, and Bird H Courts were all structurally consistent with Lopez, and even though the Bird II Court stated otherwise, all the courts including Bird I were structurally consistent with Morrison as well.
Unfortunately, the interpretive "wiggle room" has allowed the lower courts to ignore the purpose of Lopez and Morrison, which impose an outer bound on Congressional Commerce Clause power.' 13 Second [Vol. 94at best by which to check the Commerce Clause power Congress wields. 14 The tests were articulated in criminal law suits in order to send the message that Congressional Commerce Clause authority is vast. Conceptually, a sphere of authority exists within which Congress, at a minimum, has regulatory power over transactions, contracts, and general trade. Congress has incentives to seek a much larger sphere, one maximizing its political power. Lopez and Morrison provide evidence of an outer limit-a maximum size-for the sphere. However, whether Congress has authority up to the limits imposed by these two cases, or whether the cases fall substantially beyond the regulatory sphere's outer bound remains unknown. With regard to deciding this question, many of the lower courts have been deferential to Congressional authority."' However Congress, which wants maximum political authority, is not appropriately situated to dictate the outer bound of its own Commerce Clause power. To think otherwise contradicts the express intent of the Framers!" (citing Prof. Robert Bork, "hardly a friend of New Deal jurisprudence, [who] has stated, to overturn the precedent on Congress's regulatory authority over economic matters would be 'to overturn much of modem governance and plunge us into chaos"'). Second, Commerce Clause limits may be imposed on Congress through noneconomic criminal matters with less controversy, "thus creating fewer political risks for the Supreme Court." See id. at 519 ("Relatively few people are going to march to the barricades over the gun carrying law at issue in Lopez or even the gender discrimination law at issue in Morrison. Thus, a fundamental explanation for the Court's creation of space for noneconomic civic society is that it is simply an easier political task."). government. "8 For instance, the McCoy Court explained that the defendant's photograph did not "compete" in the larger, national child pornography market.'" 9 Yet the question raised by the Commerce Clause challenge is whether the law is constitutional, not whether regulation of the particular defendant's activity under the purview of the law is constitutional. Furthermore, how one is to determine in the Ninth Circuit, after McCoy, whether a particular good or activity "competes" in the national market remains a mystery. After a review of one additional statute is undertaken, this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation will be used to clear the murk.
The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the Creation of Home-Grown Machine Guns and United States v. Stewart 120
Robert Stewart, who had previously been convicted of possession and trade of illegal firearms, advertised the sale of machinegun components in national publications.
12 1 Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) agents, based on these advertisements and undercover operations, searched Stewart's home and found thirty-one firearms, which included five homemade machineguns. 22 Stewart was charged and convicted of trading machinegun components as well as possessing machineguns.
23 Stewart, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, challenged his conviction for possession of his homemade machineguns per 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) on grounds that Congress is without the authority to regulate mere possession of machineguns.124
The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the Lopez factors and determined that § 922(o) could only be constitutional by having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 25 and did not reduce overall demand in the machinegun market. 1 27 The court also distinguished Wickard, stating that the no evidence was presented that the regulation had more than an attenuated connection to interstate commerce.
8
The court went further, stating that the purpose of the regulation was not economic.
129
Yet rather than find § 922(o) facially unconstitutional, the court held that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Stewart, parroting the approach taken by the McCoy majority.
13
The Stewart Court adopted two of the same devices that the McCoy Court had used six months earlier. limited Economic Activity Test interpretation, which states that a regulation must directly affect a valuable transaction to be a regulation of an economic activity. The court did not need to say more than that the regulation was not economic, since no valuable transfer is required by the statute. Moreover, the Stewart Court also reviewed the purpose of the regulation, stating that "the regulation itself does not have an economic purpose.' 3 3 This is the second prong of this paper's Economic Activity Test interpretation, which states that a regulation of a noneconomic activity must have the purpose of directly affecting a valuable transaction to be constitutional. The structure of and justifications for this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation are discussed at length next.
III. REFINING MORRISON'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITY TEST
A problem obviously exists with the current structure for adjudicating Commerce Clause attacks. The circuit courts have implemented Lopez and Morrison with unique and diverse constructs; the only common thread is a universal refusal to find any statute facially unconstitutional. The onus for consistent and principled application of the Supreme Court's interpretive shift in Commerce Clause doctrine' 3 4 falls squarely with the appellate courts.
So why should this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation be considered any better than the others? After all, a number of useful and socially beneficial laws may be deemed unconstitutional under this interpretation. As an underlying motive for the paper, adherence to, and application of, the rule of law is considered paramount to all other judicial interests, such as fairness to individual defendants and societal optimality. The limited Economic Activity interpretation provides a robotic, unswerving test for Commerce Clause adjudication by the lower courts and also demarks a bound on the Congressional authoritative sphere consistent with Lopez and Morrison. This section is devoted to explaining the interpretation's merits over alternatives in addition to validating the interpretation through the use of past precedent. [Vol. 94
A. REFINEMENT OF THIS PAPER'S LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INTERPRETATION
The limited Economic Activity interpretation determines whether a regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. First, a law that directly affects some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. Second, a law that has the purpose of regulating some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. In determining whether a law has the purpose of regulating valuable transactions, courts should review whether a jurisdictional element is employed as well as the intent of legislature for the law. A law that satisfies either the direct regulation or the purpose category substantially affects interstate commerce, thereby satisfying Lopez and Morrison.
The two Morrison factors, existence of a jurisdictional element and the legislative intent, are critical for determining whether an indirect regulation has the purpose of directly affecting economic activity. Morrison's second factor is whether Congress has used a jurisdictional element in phrasing the law, which supports the "purpose" requirement in the following way. The jurisdictional element is typically phrased as a variant of the following: "the purchase or sale must be through interstate commerce." By imposing an "interstate commerce" requirement, Congress is limiting the law to activity that in some way involves commercial transactions. As such, the Congressional purpose more likely involves a specific commercial transaction to which the law is limited. The third Morrison factor is the legislative intent and history of the regulation. Of course, Congressional committees can "lie" in the drafting process and evince a purpose that satisfies this factor. However, the Supreme Court has reserved final judgment on whether a regulation is "economic" rather than deferring entirely to Congress.
35 Separately, though somewhat related, Congress can only believably lie to an extent. For instance, when enacting the VAWA, Congress could have demonstrated a need to halt violence against women for the purpose of preserving certain valuable transactions. 1 36 However, no reasonable court reviewing the constitutionality of the VAWA would have believed a statement that a statute passed for the general protection of women was enacted for the principal purpose of regulating valuable transactions.
' See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000). 136 Ironically, Congress relied upon the findings of commercial effects as a justification for enacting the VAWA, which had the purpose of enhancing the general safety of women. See id. at 615. The VAWA neither directly regulates valuable transactions nor has the purpose of doing so.
The efficacy of these two factors in revealing the underlying purpose of a regulation is limited, and the two are more effective at exposing a law's shortcomings rather than its merits. However, the combined efficacy of these factors need not be a panacea for determining a law's purpose. They only must provide guidance and clarity to courts determining whether a law has the purpose of regulating valuable transactions. This paper's interpretation has two limiting effects on Morrison. First, a court determining that the regulation at issue has a direct effect on a valuable transaction need not review the other Morrison factors. Second, the Attenuation Factor limits indirect regulation to only those laws that have the purpose of regulating valuable transactions. Congress may choose to regulate a noneconomic activity when the purpose of the law is to regulate valuable transactions-transactions best affected with direct regulation of some noneconomic activity.1 37 Indirect regulation with purposes other than to affect valuable transactions do not satisfy the Lopez Substantial Effects Category; this is the significant limitation imposed by this interpretation.
B. JUSTIFYING THE LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INTERPRETATION

Broad Versus Limited Attenuation
Why should the Attenuation Factor of Morrison be interpreted narrowly to impose a purpose requirement on an indirect regulation, rather than allow for some indirect regulation that does not have the purpose of operating on an economic activity? Attenuation, according to the Supreme Cort majority, was significant in the Court's determination that the VAWA was unconstitutional."' This fourth factor eliminates Congress's ability to simply state in legislative findings that a particular law affects some economic activity.' 39 The Court could have limited the Lopez Substantial 137 Consider the following example of when Congress may pass a law with the purpose of regulating valuable transactions. Suppose that Congress wants to limit loans sharks from entering contractual agreements. Through detailed study, Congressional committees have discovered that the majority of these contracts are entered by attendees of high school football games who do not have children participating in the games. Congress also has discovered that the overwhelming majority of those patrons to high school football games that do not have children participating in the contests are in the audience specifically to conduct this business. Could Congress pass a law prohibiting spectators to high school football games who do not have children participating in the contests, assuming that entry to the football game was costless? Under the "purpose" prong, this would be a direct regulation of a noneconomic activity with the purpose of indirectly regulating valuable transactions between debtors and loan sharks.
138 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 139 Id. at 614-15 (stating that Congress's assertion that the VAWA had a substantial effect on economic activity "would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the
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Effects Category to those laws having a direct effect on economic activity. In the Court's view, however, some laws that only have an indirect effect on economic activity are still constitutional; the Attenuation Factor defines that boundary. 1
40
On the one hand, a broad interpretation of attenuation may be construed, permitting courts to judge in an ad hoc manner laws with neither a direct effect on economic activity nor the purpose of directly affecting economic activity. 41 In his well-known article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Justice Scalia lists five values for the rule of law: (1) maintaining "the appearance of equal treatment" with respect to litigants similarly situated; (2) strengthening the ability of the Supreme Court to maintain uniformity; (3) enhancing predictability; (4) diminishing judicial discretion; and (5) strengthening the ability of judges to enforce the law in the face of popular opposition. 42 A broad attenuation interpretation is inferior at satisfying these goals when compared to a limited interpretation, such as the one proposed here.
For instance, under a broad interpretation of attenuation, a court could simultaneously find a law prohibiting the possession of machineguns constitutional but one prohibiting the possession of knives unconstitutional.
1 43 In this scenario, the machinegun possessor would at least appear to be disadvantaged 44 by possessing an illegal weapon designed to shoot rather than one designed to stab. Moreover, uniformity across the circuit courts could not be maintained under a broad interpretation, 145 predictability would be hopeless, 146 and judicial discretion would increase rather than diminish. 47 (Would the owner of an illegal rifle with a bayonet attached have a low or high probability of winning her Commerce Clause challenge?)
A broad interpretation of attenuation also inhibits Justice Scalia's fifth factor. In jurisdictions with a broad interpretation of attenuation, judges nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption," if relied upon completely).
"0 See id. at 612.
have both more authority and more responsibility to review case-by-case. But this responsibility weakens the ability of judges to enforce unpopular laws, and alternatively, weakens the ability of judges to reject popular laws. A judge reviewing a case in which a defendant is liable per a popular but unconstitutional law, which indirectly affects valuable transactions with no purpose of doing so and which is in a jurisdiction where only a limited attenuation interpretation exists, has the power-more appropriately, has the obligation-to find the law unconstitutional. But if the same defendant is tried in a jurisdiction where a broad interpretation carries the day, the judge is exposed to political pressure to find the law to be not too attenuated. A broad interpretation of attenuation weakens this judge's power to make unpopular decisions. In contrast, a limited interpretation of attenuation reduces, and may even eliminate, these concerns. A limited interpretation adds consistency among similarly situated litigants, adds uniformity and predictability to constitutionality reviews, decreases judicial discretion and correspondingly enhances judicial ability to make unpopular decisions. Furthermore, a limited interpretation of attenuation clarifies the requirements for Congress when making new law, assuming that Congress never wants a statute to be deemed unconstitutional by the courts. Under the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here, the Attenuation Factor of Morrison limits laws with only indirect effects on economic activity to those with the purpose of directly affecting economic activity. This interpretation allows Congress to indirectly regulate economic activity, but only in a principled and structured manner.
Circumventing the As-Applied Doctrine Under the Limited Economic Activity Interpretation
As-applied challenges 4 8 were used by the Sixth Circuit in Corp, 49 rejection of the As-Applied Doctrine in Holston,' and the McCoy dissent rejected use of the As-Applied Doctrine specifically in Commerce Clause adjudication. 154 A doctrine that eliminates the courts' ability to analyze statutes on an as-applied basis, at least within the confines of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, has merit. When a court decides that a law is unconstitutional as applied to a party, the bulk of the law still remains. Asapplied challenges carve pockets of activity out of the original law passed by Congress. What remains is a decrepit form of the original regulationweakened, but not entirely vanquished.
Two significant problems exist with as-applied constitutionality, at least with respect to Commerce Clause challenges. First, although both Lopez and Morrison were written broadly and leave much room for interpretation, the tests created in the two cases left no possibility for asapplied reviews. 55 Lopez asks courts to judge whether the law being attacked can be categorized in one of the case's three classes. Morrison asks courts to review four factors related to structure and function in order to determine whether the law has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Neither case asks whether the criminal defendant's activity was itself either economic or one with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. That Alfonzo Lopez brought his gun to school for the purpose of making a sale was irrelevant to the Lopez Court, precisely because the test for whether a law is constitutional under the Commerce Clause is not dependant on the actual activity of the defendant.
156 As-applied challenges, however, almost by definition review not the underlying law or regulation but rather the activity of the individual defendant. Since Lopez and Morrison are concerned solely with the law and not with each particular defendant's conduct, as-applied challenges have no place in this rubric.
Blind abdication to the Lopez and Morrison structure is a necessary basis on which this paper is founded, at least where an unambiguous direction was taken by the Court, such as with the application of as-applied challenges. The lower courts have consistently returned to the tests of these two cases for a skeletal framework, if not substantive guidance, when adjudicating Commerce Clause challenges.
However, an alternative justification exists for excluding as-applied challenges from Commerce Clause doctrine. As stated above, the primary pursuit of judges should be to apply the rule of law.
Justice Scalia is asked to perform double-duty here, since the reasoning for rejecting the As-Applied Doctrine in Commerce Clause challenges parallels that for preferring a limited interpretation of attenuation to a broad interpretation. 157 Admittedly, within any given circuit, a subsequent defendant identically situated to a prior defendant who won an as-applied challenge will not be liable under the same law. The activity of the subsequent defendant, identical to the prior defendant, falls within the cove of activity isolated from the remaining law after the as-applied challenge. However, a third defendant, who is only similarly situated to the two prior defendants, may still be exposed to the original law's remnants. For instance, if Charles Kallestad is charged today in the Ninth Circuit for new activity identical to his conduct in Texas,' he would not be protected by the Ninth Circuit's McCoy decision, which only carved possession of a single item of homemade child pornography out of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The first four of Justice Scalia's rule of law values are implicated here. The similarly situated defendant, like Kallestad in the Ninth Circuit, has neither a certainty nor even a significantly high probability of equal treatment. Predictability is affected short of the Kallestad defendant being guaranteed equal treatment to that of McCoy, and the current circuit splits demonstrate uniformity shortcomings. Furthermore, judicial discretion increases with as-applied challenges, since 156 Contra Ides, supra note 20, at 569 (arguing that, if economic activity is to be the new proxy for commerce, the Court conveniently ignored that Lopez intended to engage in an economic transaction).
157 See Scalia, supra note 118, at 1178-80; see also supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
'58 For an explanation of Kallestad's conduct, see supra Section II.B. 1.
judges have the authority both to determine whether to apply an as-applied challenge or facial challenge as well as to determine the extent to which the as-applied challenge will diminish the scope of the law at issue . 59 As-applied challenges negatively affect Justice Scalia's fifth value as well. Jurisdictions where as-applied challenges are permitted force judges to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular as-applied challenge is appropriate and to decide the extent to which the law affected is to be reduced in efficacy.' 6 0 In these jurisdictions, judges have both more authority and more responsibility due to the permissibility of as-applied challenges. But this responsibility both weakens the ability of judges to enforce unpopular laws and weakens the ability of judges to reject popular laws. A judge reviewing a case in which a defendant is liable per a popular but unconstitutional law, in a jurisdiction where only facial challenges are permitted, has the obligation to find the entire law facially unconstitutional. But if the same defendant is tried in a jurisdiction permitting both facial and as-applied challenges, although this defendant should be found not guilty, the judge is exposed to political pressure to find the law unconstitutional only as applied and leave in tact the rest of the unconstitutional law. Excluding as-applied challenges, at least for Commerce Clause challenges, strengthens the power of courts to make unpopular decisions.1 61 Unfortunately, the current standards by which several lower courts have applied Lopez and Morrison inappropriately permit their use.
The limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here is one such analysis that, without needing the Supreme Court to universally reject the As-Applied Doctrine, eliminates the ability for defendants to capitalize on these challenges.' 62 According to Professor Richard Fallon, as-applied challenges are the consequence of particular doctrinal structures applied by the courts. 163 A change in the applied law, such as adoption of the limited Economic Activity interpretation, may shift constitutional review from an ad hoc as-applied analysis to an analysis that facially reviews the constitutionality of a law. 64 The limited Economic Activity interpretation involves a series of iterated questions. 1 6 ' Does the law directly affect an exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all parties? If not, does the law have the purpose of affecting such a valuable transaction? Does the structure of the statute employ a jurisdiction element, or does the legislative history lend support to the regulation's asserted purpose? These questions directly address the regulation and do not inquire into the defendant's conduct with respect to the regulation. 66 Under this interpretation of the Economic Activity Test, defendants have no space within which to assert a defense that the law is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, leaving only "valid rule" facial challenge in a criminal defense lawyer's arsenal. 67 This is not to say that defendants are without recourse. A defendant always has an option to assert a statutory interpretation defense that the law in question does not apply to the conduct for which he or she is charged. In one sense, this may sound remarkably similar to an explanation of the AsApplied Doctrine and may seem to be nothing more than a semantics argument.
However, significant differences exists between the two approaches. With an as-applied challenge, the defense asserts that a particular law has been unconstitutionally applied to his or her case.
163 See Fallon, supra note 86, at 1321. Prof. Fallon argues that, conceptually, facial challenges and partial facial challenges are nothing more than special cases of as-applied challenges. Compare id. at 1324, with Henning, supra note 86, at 433 (arguing that a "valid rule" challenge, which attacks the constitutionality of a law on grounds that Congress does not have the authority to make the law, is a facial challenge independent of the facts surrounding the defendant's case).
'64 See Henning, supra note 86, at 436 ("With no Supreme Court analysis about how federalism should be applied, lower courts have asserted their authority to enforce the permissible line on a case-by-case basis, engaging in a type of ad hoc review of individual prosecutions to ensure that the proceeding involves a matter that is truly national.") (internal quotations omitted).
165 See supra Section I1I.A. Congress may draft laws very broadly with the intention of having the courts chip away at the scope through As-Applied challenges. For instance, if Congress were to pass a law federalizing all homicide,1 68 the law would be enforced until found unconstitutional by the courts. But after the first asapplied challenge was raised and sustained, the entire law would still have force, except for the space where the law was found not to apply to the particular defendant's actions.
Conversely, with a "valid rule" facial challenge, such as the only available Commerce Clause challenge remaining under the limited Economic Activity interpretation, the defendant may raise two defenses. The defendant may argue that the law exceeds the Congressional authority granted in the Constitution. Alternatively, the defendant may argue that the his or her conduct is beyond the scope of the law, which is not a constitutional challenge at all. In this scenario, Congress cannot draft law very broadly, because the first constitutional attack raised would be a facial challenge with the potential to reject the entire law. Even if a law is found facially constitutional, the scope of the law may still be too narrow to capture the defendant's conduct. If Congress passed a law federalizing all homicide, the first case challenging the new law would result in the entire law being held unconstitutional as exceeding Commerce Clause authority. If, instead, Congress passed a law federally criminalizing all transactions in which an assassin is hired to perform a homicide, then the law would likely survive a facial Commerce Clause challenge.1 69 However, a criminal defendant would have the ability to show that his or her conduct was not of the type regulated by the law.
T°T he facial challenge that results from the limited Economic Activity interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's requirement for Commerce Clause constitutionality review through a "case-by-case inquiry. ' Rather than review the constitutionality of a law as applied to 68 Thankfully, Congress has not yet attempted to acquire a police power so rooted in the traditional functions and responsibilities of the States.
"69 This example is not meant to imply that Congress would ever realistically have a reason to pass such a law. Rather, the example is only meant to show how the limited Economic Activity interpretation operates. Note that Congress would have the power to make this law under both the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this paper as well as any of the broader interpretations of Morrison currently applied by the lower courts. the defendant's conduct, the review merely asks whether the law is sufficiently broad to criminalize the defendant's actual conduct. This approach removes the burden from the courts in addressing constitutionality of every Commerce Clause law as applied to every defendant, instead placing the burden on Congress. Congress must perform an optimization, on the one hand broadening a law to capture the most possible conduct, countered on the other hand by a threat of having the entire law, if unconstitutionally broad, declared wholly unconstitutional.
Summary of the Limited Economic Activity Interpretation's Benefits
A summary of the benefits derived under the limited Economic Activity interpretation is in order. First, the interpretation is among the many interpretations consistent with Lopez and Morrison, a necessary condition if this paper is to have any real persuasive force among the lower courts. Second, the interpretation limits the Morrison factors, particularly the Attenuation Factor, in a structured and principled manner. In doing so, the interpretation raises creation of and abidance by a rule of law above other judicial goals. The interpretation is also superior to a broad interpretation of Morrison at satisfying Justice Scalia's five factors for assessing various rules of law. Finally, the interpretation eliminates the ability of defendants to raise as-applied constitutional challenges, thereby limiting defendants' defenses to facial challenges coupled with statutory interpretation arguments. As with a narrow interpretation of attenuation, a doctrine, such as the one proposed here, that eliminates as-applied challenges better satisfies Justice Scalia's factors than a doctrine that does not.
C. VALIDATION THROUGH PAST SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT The Court, in both Lopez and Morrison, reaffirmed the post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, stating that an outer bound had always existed despite ever-increasing expanses of authority under the Clause. 72 This paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation must consistently yield the outcomes reached by the Court over the past sixty years. In order to have any persuasive power among the lower courts, this paper, founded on the premise that the lower courts will abide by Lopez and Morrison, must defer to those cases, which did not overturn a single New Deal or post-New Deal . This is a regulation directly affecting a valuable transaction, since the employees receive wages in exchange for the services received by the employers. The Act also prevents shipment in interstate commerce of goods created by labor not conforming to the prescribed minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. Prevention of shipments for particular reasons imposes regulation directly on a transaction. The transaction is valuable to both the employer, seeking pecuniary gains from the trade of the produced goods, and the purchaser, seeking some benefit from ownership of the goods. Thus, this part of the Act also satisfies the requirements imposed by the "direct affect" prong of the limited Economic Activity interpretation. 
IV. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF THE LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INTERPRETATION
With an understanding of the mechanics of the limited Economic Activity interpretation as well as some confidence in the interpretation's appropriateness through Supreme Court validation, the current circuit court conflicts may now be analyzed. This section reviews the circuit court splits in light of the limited Economic Activity interpretation. Additionally, the interpretation's effects are assessed beyond the realm of the criminal law setting in environmental regulation.
A. ADDRESSING THE SPLIT CIRCUITS
Possession of Child Pornography, 18 U.S. C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
Recall that the courts in Rodia, Kallestad The first step under the limited Economic Activity interpretation is to address whether the statute directly affects a valuable transaction. 86 Section 2252(a)(4)(B) only regulates possession, which unlike transactions, only involves one person. Admittedly, trades occur between manufacturers of the materials needed to make child pornography, but the law criminalizes possession of child pornography, not the trade of materials that may possibly be used by someone producing child pornography. As such, the regulation does not involve a transaction. 187 Focus turns to the second step, which calls for a review of whether the purpose of the regulation is to affect a valuable transaction. Use of a jurisdictional element and legislative history aid in this inquiry. The statute does employ a jurisdictional element, 88 but the element does not modify possession of child pornography.
Rather, the jurisdictional element modifies the shipment of materials prior to their use in making child pornography. The element used here does not support a finding that the purpose of the statute is to regulate a valuable transaction. More significantly, the legislative history states that the purpose of the statute is to enhance federal efforts to "combat child pornography."' 89 Effects of child pornography, like effects of gender abuse seen in Morrison, have an effect on the national economy. In terms of the limited Economic Activity . 186 The statute prohibits the possession of child pornography that was produced using material that had traveled through interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2003) . Note that § 2252(a)(4)(B) also criminalizes possession of child pornography when the finished product has been shipped through interstate commerce. That part of the statute has not been attacked on Commerce Clause grounds and is constitutional under the "purpose" category of the limited Economic Activity interpretation. 187 The value element (i.e., "valuable transaction") is satisfied by possession, since, economically speaking, people only possess things of value. However, "value" in the limited Economic Activity interpretation modifies "transaction" and is alone insufficient.
188 The statute criminalizes possession of child pornography "produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
189 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; S. REP. No. 95-438, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 47 (advocating legislative changes and enforcement procedures in order to enhance combative efforts). Congress was concerned that "because of the vast potential profits in child pornography, these sordid enterprises are growing at a very rapid rate." Id. at 7.
interpretation, the Congressional findings show that the purpose of the statute is protection of children from being abused and exploited.' 90 Although certainly problematic, the exploitation of children for the production of pornography is not a valuable transaction affected by the statute. As such, under the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this paper, criminalizing mere possession of child pornography produced with material that has traveled through interstate commerce per 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is not an economic activity and is consequently unconstitutional.1 9 1
The Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248
The next statute to address is the FACE Act, which criminalizes attempts to prevent access to abortion clinic entrances. 92 The first category of the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here can be easily applied to § 248. The statute criminalizes attempts to prevent access to abortion clinic entrances. Obstruction of a building's entrance is not a valuable transaction. 196 The party attempting to enter the building does not contract with the person obstructing the entrance for the privilege of being obstructed. Without an exchange or contract, the "direct affect" category fails, and a review of the statute's purpose is required.
To be constitutional, the purpose of the regulation must be to affect a valuable transaction, and in addressing purpose, the existence of a jurisdictional element and legislative findings are probative but not dispositive.1 97 Section 248 of the FACE Act includes no jurisdictional element. Moreover, " [t] he Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is designed to protect health care providers and patients from violent attacks, blockades, threats of force, and related conduct intended to interfere with the exercise of the constitutional right to terminate pregnancy."' 98 In other words, the stated purpose of the Act is not the preservation of abortion transactions but rather the protection of the constitutional right of women to have access to safe abortions.
Section 248 is an example of when review of the second and third Morrison factors does not end the inquiry. 99 Unlike the VAWA, in which Congress could not point to any specific type of valuable transaction negatively affected by gender abuse, and unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), in which child safety was regulated through the criminalization of homemade child pornography possession, not child pornography transactions, the purpose of § 248 is protection of valuable abortion transactions. Admittedly, concerns for the safety of those entering and exiting abortion clinics parallels those concerns for children abused by the child pornography industry. But the purpose of § 248 is to protect the valuable contracts between patients and abortion clinics being transacted by inhibiting activists from barricading clinic entrances, which must be accessible for these transactions to occur. In disagreement with the Southern District of Texas's Bird II holding, analyzing the FACE Act through the lens of this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation results in holding the Act constitutional.
with § 2252(a)(4)(B), no argument can be made that the activity is an exchange, transaction, or contract.
197 See supra Section III.A. '9' S. REP. No. 103-117 at I I (1993) ("The express purpose of the violent and threatening activity . . . is to deny women access to safe and legal abortion services. Anti-abortion activists have made it plain that this conduct is part of a deliberate campaign to eliminate access by closing clinics and intimidating doctors.").
'99 See generally McGinnis, supra note 3, at 514 (arguing that Congress does not make findings in an unbiased way, but rather "tend[s] to find whatever predicates are necessary to advance its members' prospects of reelection").
Possession of Home-Grown Machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
The final statute to review is 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which criminalizes all unsanctioned transfer and possession of machineguns. 00 The Ninth Circuit in Stewart held that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendants in mere possession of homemade machineguns. 2 0 1 As with both 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and the FACE Act, the "possession" category of § 922(o) does not directly affect an exchange, transaction, or contract. 0 2 Although machinegun ownership may have value to gun enthusiasts, various assassins, and citizens particularly concerned about personal safety, possession does not equal exchange.
The regulation is thus only constitutional if the purpose is to affect a valuable transaction. However, according to the Ninth Circuit, "there is no evidence that § 922(o) was enacted to regulate commercial aspects of the machinegun business. 2 3 Moreover, the express purpose of the law is to provide support to local, state, and federal law enforcement alike in fighting crime and violence. 2°F inally, § 922(o) employs no jurisdictional element whatsoever. (1996) . In that case, the court held § 922(o) constitutional under the Lopez first category: a channel of commerce. The court reasoned that possession of machineguns must be preceded by trade of machineguns through interstate commerce. Stewart "reveals the limits of Rambo's logic," since Stewart fabricated the machineguns himself See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1135.
202 The "transfer" category of § 922(o) is analyzed differently. For this category, the regulation may have a direct effect on a valuable transaction. Presumably, a transfer of a machinegun from a transferor is accompanied by some remuneration paid by the machinegun recipient to the transferor. Further, the machinegun has value to the recipient and the cash exchanged for the machinegun has value to the transferor. As such, the transfer of machinegun regulation in § 922(o) is a regulation of a valuable transaction consistent with the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here. Their concerns are understandable, considering that much, if not all, existing environmental regulation enhances the public welfare. Furthermore, the States are each at a strategic disadvantage compared to the federal government when regulating the consumption of environmental resources, since each state would prefer less environmental regulation to more, thereby causing an environmental "race to the bottom. 20 7 Environmentalists should not construe the limited Economic Activity interpretation as signaling the demise of federal environmental regulation and the consequential approach of an environmental Armageddon. Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for an expanded interpretation of "commerce" to operate in the modem industrial world. 
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[Vol. 94 interpretation of the Attenuation Factor only operates on the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez and not on either the Channels of Commerce Category or the Instrumentalities of Commerce Category. Under this construct, all regulation of pollution in the air and waterways will not be affected by the approach of this paper, since all pollution regulation is regulation of the channels of commerce. Even pollution of underground water tables is protected, since this water eventually reaches surface waterways. Environmentalists should take comfort in the fact that, even if the Court one day adopts Justice Thomas's Originalist's interpretation of "commerce" and the Commerce Clause, regulation of channels, upheld since the Marshall Court, will still be preserved. 0 9
The regulation of human encroachment on and destruction of wildlife, however, is different. The Endangered Species Act of 1973210 regulates neither channels of commerce, since plants and animals are not comparable to lakes, streams, or air; nor instrumentalities, since wildlife is not akin to trucks, boats, or airplanes. As such, the Endangered Species Act must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, per the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here, in order to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Since regulating the protection of animals is not the direct regulation of valuable transactions, the Act must have the purpose of effecting valuable transactions. But the Act employs no jurisdictional element. Further, the Act's purpose is to preserve ecosystems inhabited by endangered species and to provide programs for the conservation of endangered and threatened species. 2 1 ' The Act preserves the "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of wildlife for the nation's benefit 2 And unlike the FACE Act, the Endangered Species Act does not have an unstated purpose of directly affecting a valuable transaction. As such, the Act does not have the purpose of regulating a valuable transaction and is accordingly unconstitutional under the limited Economic Activity interpretation. This shows the unfortunate side-effect of curbing the once-plenary power Congress wielded; some popular, socially beneficial laws are simply unconstitutional when the Commerce Clause is not interpreted to make Congress omnipotent. Bounds must be drawn on Congressional Commerce Clause power in order for federalism to survive, and the Endangered Species Act is beyond the bound drawn by the limited Economic Activity interpretation.
Environmentalists, however, should neither concede the fight for wildlife nor turn their ire toward the limited Economic Activity interpretation. Instead, focus should turn to the Constitution's amendment process. 213 Regulation of the environment, as Professor Donald Regan notes, cannot be successfully implemented by the competing states. 21 4 Furthermore, the environment is a public good that cannot go unregulated, due to Tragedy of the Commons problems. 2 " In other words, regulation of endangered species, and more generally, regulation of the environment as a whole, belongs with the federal government. Since under the limited Economic Activity interpretation, the Constitution currently does not provide Congress with certain environmental regulatory powers, such as those needed for the Endangered Species Act to be constitutional, a Constitutional amendment is the appropriate resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the circuit courts currently refuse to strictly abide by Morrison due to confusion, ideological disagreement, or belief that Lopez and Morrison do not amount to new Commerce Clause restrictions, the refusal has led to a variety of inconsistencies in Commerce Clause constitutionality attacks. Unfortunately, this is an area in which uniformity is most desired, particularly because Congress will not abide by the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause limitations when making federal criminal law knowing that the laws will not be found unconstitutional in the lower courts. The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), the child pornography possession statute; the FACE Act; and 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), the machinegun possession statute, all are ripe for further adjudication. Although review of any one of these by the Supreme Court will offer the opportunity for further refinement of the Morrison Economic Activity Test, uniformity and consistency may also be achieved if lower courts adhere to the guiding principles relied upon in this paper. This paper has shown that a workable, clear standard exists for deciding whether a regulated activity is "economic." The paper has also shown that a clear standard does not need to conflict with a desired "caseby-case inquiry." With further review, the once-plenary "Hey, you-can-dowhatever-you-feel-like Clause 2 16 will again have the form of an 
